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Abstract – On 22 October 2012, seven members of the Italian Major Risk Commission were found
guilty the injuries of 4 and manslaughter of 29 people in relation to the 2009 earthquake that hit
L’Aquila, a town in Central Italy. ese members were sentenced to six years in prison for fail-
ing to meet their obligations to adequately analyse seismic risk and provide clear, correct and
complete information, which might have saved many lives. e case has not yet been concluded.
us far, the debate has mainly focused on the scientiﬁc, legal and communicative aspects of the
verdict, while the institutional dimension, including the co-production of scientiﬁc advice and de-
cision making, has received less aention. Co-production processes shape how scientiﬁc advice
is used to make real world decisions and how diﬀerent priorities, tasks, purposes and organi-
zational cultures of scientists and practitioners can inﬂuence the decision making process. We
argue that understanding the event and the legal aermath requires a knowledge of the deep epis-
temic uncertainty intrinsic to the nature of scientiﬁc advice as well as the responsibility overlaps
of scientists-turned-decision-makers. Another relevant institutional aspect is the concern of the
national and local authorities that the population would over-react to anything other than a re-
assuring message. We discuss the consequences of this framing of the emergency management
problem in terms of public control rather than public safety. We argue that an eﬀective warning
communication should inform people about the precautionary actions to undertake as well as the
risks, beneﬁts, and costs of their decisions, thereby allowing them to make sound and responsible
choices.
Keywords – epistemic uncertainty, science policy co-production, emergency communication, com-
munication paradoxes
1. Introduction
Providing scientiﬁc advice to decision makers has never
been easy, and it is particularly diﬃcult when the facts
are uncertain and the stakes are high, as it is in issuing
a warning for a natural disaster (Funtowicz and Ravetz
2008). One aspect of the communication diﬃculty is that
scientists work in a world of uncertainties and probabil-
ities, while practitioners and decision makers oen pre-
fer straightforward answers and clear suggestions about
what to do, especially when facing a crisis (Cash et al.
2006; McNie 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke 2007). However,
even if they have diﬀerent priorities, tasks, objectives and
even understandings of the problem, scientists and prac-
titioners must cooperate in order for eﬀective decision-
making to take place, especially when scientiﬁc knowl-
edge plays a determinative role. Given the diﬀerences
in purposes and organizational cultures between the sci-
entiﬁc and institutional communities, diﬃculties arise in
conveying scientiﬁc uncertainties, in deﬁning what is an
acceptable level of risk and who has the responsibility to
set the thresholds, and ultimately inmaking science useful
for practitioners. Yet, notwithstanding these diﬃculties,
decisions are co-produced through the interactions be-
tween these communities. Co-production processes shape
how scientiﬁc advice is implemented on the ground. In its
own turn, this advice can have relevant consequences for
local residents, as was tragically demonstrated by the 2009
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earthquake that hit the Italian town of L’Aquila.
e L’Aquila case shows how decisions become par-
ticularly diﬃcult in cases of deep epistemic uncertainty
and institutional overlap – i.e. when there are major gaps
in the ability to understand phenomena and outcomes,
coupled with overlapping roles, responsibilities and man-
dates in the decision making processes. e moment
magnitude (Mm) 6.3 earthquake claimed more than 300
lives and injured more than 1600 people. It also repre-
sented a “worst case scenario” for scientiﬁc advisors, be-
cause it led to the conviction of seven members of the
Italian Major Risk Commission for negligence in provid-
ing hazard-assessment advice before the earthquake. e
allegation claimed that the scientists failed to fulﬁl their
obligations to i) provide clear, correct and complete in-
formation that might have saved many people lives and,
ii) adequately analyse seismic risk (as reported in the ver-
dict n.380/2012). Following their conviction, the members
were sentenced to six years in prison and ﬁned several
million euros. At the time of this writing (August 2013),
the accused scientists are appealing the verdict and legal
experts anticipate that the ﬁnal resolution of the case may
be years away.
is case provides a sobering opportunity for reﬂec-
tion for those who deal with disasters and disaster re-
search, for several reasons. As we will describe in the fol-
lowing sections, the verdict caused heated reactions. So
far, the debate has focused on the scientiﬁc, legal and com-
municative aspects of the verdict, while the institutional
aspects have received less aention. Here, we focus on
the institutional facets of the phenomenon and more pre-
cisely on the role of scientists as advisors in the decision-
making process as well as the multiple institutional and
communicative issues that inﬂuence how science advice is
given and received. In order to comment on these issues,
we start by providing a description of what happened in
L’Aquila before and aer the 2009 earthquake.
2. e l’Aquila earthquake
2.1. e seismic swarm and the 6th April event
At 03:32 on 6 April 2009, a devastating Mm 6.3 earthquake
struck the city of L’Aquila and its province, also named
L’Aquila, in Central Italy. In addition to claiming more
than 300 lives and injuring more than 1600 people, the
disaster destroyed some 20,000 buildings and le 66,000
people temporarily displacedwith an estimated damage of
some 16 billion USD (Ozerdem and Ruﬁni 2013; DeMarchi
2013 b). e main shock had been preceded by a seismic
swarm with hundreds of modest phenomena up to a mag-
nitude Mw 4.0 on 30 March 2009. is swarm originated
approximately half a year earlier in October 2008. Given
the long duration of the swarm, residents were under-
standably alarmed. In such a tense situation, the numer-
ous unoﬃcial warnings by a technician formerly working
in a laboratory of the National Research Council captured
signiﬁcant media aention. On the basis of radon mea-
surements that he had performed, he insisted that a major
earthquake was soon going to occur. His unoﬃcial warn-
ings particularly outraged the head of the National De-
partment Civil Protection (NDCP), who reported him to
the authorities for diﬀusing alarming news. He also sub-
sequently convened a meeting of the Major Risks Com-
mission, which is a consultative body of the National Ser-
vice for Civil Protection for “providing advice about fore-
cast and prevention of the various risk hypotheses” (art.
9 l. 225/1992, last update l. 100/2012)¹.
e meeting of the Commission took place on 31
March in L’Aquila with the aim to “provide the citizens
of Abruzzo with all the information available to the scien-
tiﬁc community about the seismic activities of the previ-
ous weeks” (verdict n. 380/2012: III). As reported by the
head of the NDCP, there was a “need to reassure the resi-
dents and to organize an event for the media (operazione
mediatica)” (ibidem: 131). Already prior to the meeting,
reassurance was provided to journalists and residents by
a member of the Major Risk Commission stating that the
seismic situation in L’Aquila was normal because of the
continuous discharge of energy due to the seismic swarm
(ibidem).
e need to reassure the populationwas also related to
the fact that the situation had grown very tense and resi-
dents were confused by contradictory information. More-
over, given a history of such tragedies, such as a 1703
earthquake that killed more than 3,000, the recourse of
action in the face of such swarms for the local popula-
tion has been marked by high risk aversion with people
frequently choosing to go outside to be safe in case of an
earthquake.
During the meeting, it was reaﬃrmed that no scien-
tiﬁcally sound method exists to predict earthquakes. e
Commission came to the scientiﬁcally correct conclusion,
that there is deep uncertainty and thus did not provide any
speciﬁc line of action: “it is unlikely that an earthquake
like the one in 1703 could occur in the short term, but
the possibility cannot be totally excluded.” (statement of a
member of the Major Risk Commission). Today, science
is still unable to predict earthquakes and seismic swarms
are not robustly linked to large seismic events. Seismolo-
gists agree that it is not possible to identify a priori a seis-
mic sequence that anticipates a large shock with respect
to many other seismic sequences that do not end with a
big earthquake. For example, according to Grandori et al.
(2009), only 2% of swarm activity has been linked to large
seismic events and there is no theory that links precur-
sor signals conclusively to severe earthquakes. L’Aquila
is such an example because the town had already experi-
enced swarm episodes in earlier times, which did not lead
to a large earthquake.
e meeting was followed by a press conference
where no speciﬁc measures of protection were suggested
while it was reiterated that no scientiﬁcally soundmethod
exists to predict earthquakes.
¹e Major Risk Commission activities are of a techno-scientiﬁc and advisory type and include providing guidance in connection with the forecast
and prevention of the diﬀerent risk situations. Among others, the Commission, which usually meets every two months, deﬁnes research needs for the
Civil Protection, evaluates results and assesses risks
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2.2. e verdict
ree and a half years aer the event, a court case received
major media aention. On 22 October 2012, seven mem-
bers of the Italian Major Risk Commission were found
guilty of manslaughter of 29 persons and injuries caused
to 4 others. e 781-page verdict, made publicly avail-
able on 18 January 2013, is the result of a penal process
which included 31 hearings from September 2011 to Oc-
tober 2012.
Some relatives of the victims claimed that because
they believed the oﬃcial information, their family mem-
bers and themselves chose not to apply protective mea-
sures and did not leave their homes on the night of 6 April.
As noted in the recently published verdict, the statements
made during the press conference by the members of the
Commission caused a “psychological reaction consisting
in a double mechanism: i) collective removal of the seis-
mic fear, ii) strong belief in the reassurance indications
and assessments provided by the Commission, which has
been favoured by its credibility and authority” (verdict
n. 380/2012: 574). Moreover the judge focused on what
he deﬁned as contradictory information provided by the
scientists which -the judge argues- reassured the popula-
tion, likely also due to an “ampliﬁcation eﬀect” guaran-
teed by the media. As one example of contradictory in-
formation, the judge cited the excerpts of interviews by
two members of the Commission: “Any earthquake fore-
cast does not have scientiﬁc foundation” and “e scien-
tiﬁc community tells us there is no danger because there
is an ongoing discharge of energy” (ibidem: 375). ese
excerpts of interviews clearly illustrate the diﬃculties in
conveying scientiﬁc uncertainty. So far, the existing dis-
cussion on L’Aquila earthquake has focused on the scien-
tiﬁc, legal and communicative aspects of the verdict, such
as earthquake forecasting, scientiﬁc proofs during a trial
and uncertainty communication. In the next section, we
will summarise the key points of this heated debate.
2.3. e reactions to the verdict
Earthquake forecasting represented one of the main top-
ics discussed in relation to the L’Aquila case. Before the
verdict, more than 5,000 scientists signed an open leer to
the president of Italy, stating that the seven Italians face
(unfair) criminal charges for failing to predict the earth-
quake. Pinpointing the time, location and strength of a
future earthquake in the short term remains, according to
a scientiﬁc consensus, technically impossible (Hall 2011).
Seismologists from all over the world have expressed their
support for the convicted colleagues, including support
leers frommore than thirty associations (for an overview
see hp://processoaquila.wordpress.com/international-
support/; Nosengo 2010; Hall 2011; Aspinall 2011;
Cartlidge 2012; Marzocchi 2012; Wyss 2013; Amato et
al. 2013). e reactions have been focused on the lack of
accepted scientiﬁc method for earthquake prediction, the
ignorance of the general public (or even the jurists) about
the concepts of probability or uncertainty and, more in
general, on the scientiﬁc aspects of the verdict which has
even been deﬁned as a “lawsuit against science” (Amato
et al. 2013; Marzocchi 2012).
e solidarity statements point out that it is not the
fault of the scientists if the public and even the jurists are
unable to understand what uncertainty in hazard and risk
assessment really means and that beer education should
be provided. “If the jurists would have a correct percep-
tion of probability, this trial would have never started”
(Gasparini and Leone 2012: I). Indeed “the accusation im-
plicitly follows a logical fallacy: ‘if scientists say that an
event is unlikely, but this event actually happens, this
means that the scientists are wrong’” (Marzocchi 2013:17).
Many colleagues of the seven convicted add to this point
by highlighting how the verdict wrongly assumes that
there is a responsibility of scientists for the correctness
of their assertions. e reactions from the legal commu-
nity have also been heated, but they focused on diﬀerent
issues such as the concept of acceptable risk, the causal
nexus between the experts statements and residents’ be-
haviours, and more in general on the issue of scientiﬁc
proofs during a trial, e.g. what proofs should be used and
how to evaluate the quality of scientiﬁc evidence (Zalin
and Bui 2013; Tallacchini 2013; Masera 2013).
Finally, what happened in L’Aquila has also been in-
terpreted as a failure of science communication. For ex-
ample, Ropeik (2012) maintains that “the trial was not
about science, not about seismology, not about the ability
or inability of scientists to predict earthquakes. ese con-
victions were about poor risk communication, and more
broadly, about the responsibility that scientists have as
citizens to share their expertise in order to help people
make informed and healthy choices.” Beyond this we pro-
vide some additional reﬂections on the role and respon-
sibility of scientists in the production of scientiﬁc advice
for decision makers.
3. e co-production of scientiﬁc advice and decisions
Depending also on the (disciplinary) perspectives that are
used to interpret what happened, many lessons can be de-
rived from the L’Aquila case. So far, the institutional side
of the decision process has received lile aention. We
argue that the presence of deep epistemic uncertainty in-
trinsic in the scientiﬁc advice coupled with unclear and
mixed roles of the scientists-turned-decision-makers are
fundamental to understanding the event and the legal af-
termath. Two aspects are particularly relevant, one is re-
lated to responsibility overlaps and the other to the need
of emergency managers to reassure the public and control
overreactions of the residents.
3.1. Role and responsibility overlaps
Aer the meeting held on 31 March in L’Aquila, the mem-
bers of the Italian Major Risk Commission simultaneously
acted as advisors, public oﬃcials, and decision makers
(without necessarily being aware of it). As reported in
the minutes of the meeting, the aims were to: i) provide
an objective evaluation of the seismic events, also in rela-
tion with what can be forecasted; and ii) discuss and pro-
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vide advice about the warnings (Presidenza del Consiglio
dei Ministri 2009). In other words, the scientists were re-
quested to provide suggestions not only on scientiﬁc is-
sues but also on decision making. Moreover, as reported
in the verdict, “the Commission, due to a pre-established
[by the head of the NDPC] communication strategy, was
not addressing its advice to the Civil Protection Depart-
ment, but directly to the population” (verdict n.380/2012:
175). To understand this point it is important to clarify
that the Commission is a national consultative body rep-
resenting the formal communication channel between the
NDCP and the scientiﬁc community ². Its activities are
of a techno-scientiﬁc and advisory type and in case of
events of great intensity (deﬁned as “Type C events”, law
225/1992, law 401/2001, law 100/2012), the Commission is
in charge of providing evaluations and assistance to the
NDCP. On this basis, the last one (directly or through its
local branches at the regional, provincial and municipal
level) provides information to the population.
e legislation clearly distinguishes the role of the sci-
entiﬁc advisor from decision makers, but the border be-
tween provision and communication of scientiﬁc informa-
tion is easy to cross.
In this case, the scientists acted as advisors, public of-
ﬁcials, and decision makers at the same time. It is clear
that this overlap of roles inﬂuenced the entire commu-
nication process. In this way the scientists have been
made co-responsible, if not entirely responsible, for the
decision on how to communicate the risk to the popula-
tion. eir role and related responsibility (of which most
of them were not even aware of, see Boschi 2013) de-
ﬂected the aention from the national and local decision
making bodies for managing emergencies, and it also re-
ﬂected the diﬃculties of those in power to actually make
a decision on whether or not to evacuate an area. is
is where the co-production of scientiﬁc advice and deci-
sion making became particularly diﬃcult. In Italy, as in
many other countries, the mayor is the ultimate responsi-
ble authority for issuing a warning aer having consulted
the provincial and regional authorities (l. 225/1992). e
Italian legislative framework for warnings varies across
the regions, but in general the laws do not provide spe-
ciﬁc tasks for diﬀerent hazards. Indeed some hazards, like
ﬂoods or storms, can be more easily associated to warn-
ings, than for example earthquakes. In addition to false
negative warnings as in the case of L’Aquila, false posi-
tives can have huge negative consequences and those in
charge typically fear both situations (Woo 2011). For ex-
ample, aer the Sarno landslide in 1998 (which killed 137
residents), themayor was sentenced to ﬁve years in prison
and interdiction from public roles because he did not give
an order to evacuate the town (Corriere del Mezzogiorno
2011). Another example is that one of the reasons why the
New Orleans mayor was reluctant to order a city evacua-
tion in 2005, when Hurricane Katrina hit the city, was the
fear that the city government would be sued for disrupt-
ing local tourism (Woo 2011).
3.2. Public control and public safety
e relatives claimed that the behaviour of the victims
was inﬂuenced by the reassuring information provided
during the press conference by the members of the Ma-
jor Risk Commission. As repeated several times in the
verdict, the aim of the Commission meeting was actu-
ally to reassure local residents and to spread the mes-
sage through the mass media (court verdict n.380/2012:
169). e meeting was followed by a press conference
where no speciﬁc measures of protection were suggested
to the citizens. However, it was also reaﬃrmed that no
scientiﬁcally sound method exists to predict earthquakes.
Reassurances were provided to journalists and residents
that the seismic situation in L’Aquila was normal and
“favourable because of the continuous discharge of energy
due to the seismic swarm” (court verdict: III).
Finding ways of reducing residents’ psychological
stress aer months of minor tremors and avoiding panic
was a major concern for practitioners and emergency
managers. As reported in the minutes of the meeting of
the Major Risk Commission: “e problem is worsened
because the population is worried and alarmed from un-
controlled voices which cause panic. We have to under-
stand what is going on from a scientiﬁc point of view and
provide reliable/certain information” (Presidenza del Con-
siglio dei Ministri 2009: 2). In other words, national and
local authorities seemed to be motivated by a concern that
people would over-react to anything other than a calming
message and the risk management problem was therefore
framed in terms of public control rather than public safety
(De Marchi 2013 a).
Such behaviour is not new and has been reported in
several other cases and studies in the ﬁeld of psychol-
ogy, sociology of disasters and risk communication (e.g.
arantelli and Dynes 1972; Otway and Wynne 1989).
Research results have shown how fear can be an eﬀec-
tive mechanism in the event of an impending and un-
predictable danger. And indeed fear is a mechanism that
keeps animals (including humans) alert in dangerous sit-
uations, as opposed to panic, which triggers life threat-
ening behaviour. Unfortunately, avoiding panic is such a
major concern for public authorities that they oen fail to
make the appropriate distinctions between fear and panic,
focusing their aention on the possibility of panic and as-
suming that residents would adopt life-threatening rather
than life-saving behaviours.
In risk communication research, this concept has al-
ready been deﬁned as the information targeting paradox
(Otway and Wynne 1989). is paradox concerns the as-
sumption of the public authorities that the dissemination
of emergency informationmust be restricted to avoid pub-
lic overreactions and panic. e same authors also de-
ﬁned another paradox, which can be relevant for the case
of L’Aquila, i.e. the information cultures paradox, which
arises from the awareness that each organization reﬂects
its own information culture need. Science and decision-
making are separate domains with very diﬀerent forms of
²is deﬁnition is reported in the oﬃcial website of the Italian Civil Protection Agency.
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legitimization, and therefore have diﬀerent ways of pro-
ducing and deﬁning uncertainty, usable knowledge and
information, etc. (Fischoﬀ 1995, 2013; McNie 2007). In
this case the main objective of scientists and researchers
was to deal with uncertainties in hazard and risk assess-
ment. e main objective of practitioners was instead to
avoid liability in case of damages or, even worst, losses in
human life.
4. Discussion
e case of L’Aquila is particularly tragic and complex as
a risk that could not be robustly predicted turned into an
actual disaster. ere are other disasters that can be pre-
dicted and where early warning is eﬀective. Yet uncer-
tainty is a key issue to reckon with as well. As described
in the previous sections, a key problem was the deep epis-
temic uncertainty and the fact that it is still not possible
to provide clear information on the role of seismic swarms
as earthquake precursors. Yet, an important question re-
mains: How could available information reassure the pop-
ulation? Or, more in general: How could any kind of in-
formation reassure the population, if earthquakes cannot
be predicted? (De Marchi 2013 b) How can this informa-
tion be communicated to citizens while taking into con-
sideration two contradictory goals, i.e. to avoid messages
leading to overreactions by population and to provide in-
formation under conditions of epistemic uncertainty?
Beside the lessons that can be learned from research in
sociology and risk communication (see section 3.2), there
is also a need to beer understand not only the kind of in-
formation that scientists can provide, but also the purpose
of this information and how it ﬁts in the decision-making
chain. e quality of a decision cannot be evaluated sep-
arately from the process, which leads to it and requires
transparency and accountability.
To summarise, we argue that to beer understand the
co-production of scientiﬁc advice and decision-making in
the case of deep uncertainty, the role and mandate of sci-
entiﬁc advisors needs to be carefully evaluated and ex-
plicitly deﬁned. is raises a number of questions, such as
who should actually be responsible for decisions about the
warning, how this responsibility should be shared with
local population, what is the purpose of the scientiﬁc ad-
vice provided by experts, who are the recipients, and to
what extent are they responsible for their own actions
and decisions. An eﬀective warning should inform people
about potential protection action to undertake and about
the risks, beneﬁts, and costs of their decisions, thereby al-
lowing them to make sound and responsible choices (Fis-
chhoﬀ 2013).
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